[Upcoming] O risco dos ativos influencia a governança corporativa no Mercado Contínuo espanhol?

Palavras-chave

governança corporativa
gestão da governança corporativa
conselho de administração
remuneração

Como Citar

Trigo, E., Garayeta, A., Corral-Lage, J., & De La Peña, J. I. I. (2026). [Upcoming] O risco dos ativos influencia a governança corporativa no Mercado Contínuo espanhol?. RBGN - Revista Brasileira De Gestão De Negócios, 28(2). https://doi.org/10.7819/rbgn.v28i2.4340

Resumo

Objetivo – Este estudo examina a relação entre governança corporativa e modelos de estimativa de risco de ativos nos níveis agregado e setorial.

Referencial teórico – A União Europeia promove as melhores práticas de governança corporativa, e a Espanha exige o cumprimento do Relatório e das Recomendações de Governança Corporativa.

Metodologia – Utilizando informações contábeis e divulgações públicas obrigatórias, o estudo estima modelos de regressão linear múltipla para examinar a relação entre as principais dimensões da governança corporativa (remuneração, monitoramento e estrutura de governança) e o risco dos ativos.

Resultados – No nível intersetorial, a análise mostra que a maior parte da variabilidade no risco dos ativos depende de duas variáveis de controle (tamanho e pertencimento ao setor financeiro) e de uma variável relacionada à governança corporativa (a porcentagem de diretores proprietários). Os resultados não fornecem evidências estatisticamente significativas que apoiam as hipóteses relativas às variáveis relacionadas à governança corporativa, o que justifica a necessidade de uma análise setorial. Uma vez eliminada a heterogeneidade intersetorial, a presença de acionistas de blocos, a remuneração dos executivos, a existência de conselheiros proprietários e o número de reuniões do conselho explicam uma proporção significativa da variabilidade intrasetorial.

Implicações práticas e sociais da pesquisa – Os reguladores podem promover estruturas de governança, os investidores podem avaliar seu perfil de risco com base no tamanho e no setor da empresa, e os conselhos de administração podem adaptar a governança corporativa ao seu setor.

Originalidade – O estudo utiliza informações públicas obrigatórias disponíveis desde 2018 para examinar a relação entre governança corporativa e risco de ativos, destacando a heterogeneidade intersetorial e a necessidade de análise setorial.

https://doi.org/10.7819/rbgn.v28i2.4340

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