Palavras-chave
Empresas familiares
Diretores externos
Desempenho da empresa
Mercados emergentes
Como Citar
Resumo
Referencial teórico – Com base na teoria da agência e seus derivados, capturamos as especificidades das empresas familiares em relação às empresas não familiares.
Metodologia – Com base em um banco de dados extenso e atualizado de mais de 370 empresas de capital aberto no Brasil, este estudo realizou regressões de dados em painel com efeitos fixos em três variáveis de resposta diferentes, a fim de ter uma perspectiva mais ampla e reduzir o viés dos resultados. Além disso, realizamos testes de robustez com diferentes métodos de medição. Também testamos a seleção de variáveis abordando os critérios de validade interna e externa, além de validade convergente e nomológica, de acordo com a literatura.
Resultados – Os resultados empíricos indicam que há uma relação entre a independência do conselho e o desempenho financeiro de curto prazo em um grupo de empresas familiares.
Implicações práticas e sociais da investigação – Esta pesquisa contribui para vários agentes, fornecendo insights relevantes sobre um importante critério de ESG, o que abre um caminho para estudos futuros.
Contribuições – Essa é uma nova abordagem para fenômenos relevantes da perspectiva de empresas familiares em comparação com empresas não familiares. Além disso, este artigo aprofunda o estudo de empresas familiares e considera diferentes grupos de empresas.
Palavras-chave – governança corporativa, empresas familiares, diretores externos, desempenho da empresa, mercados emergentes.
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